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Abstract
In an oligopolistic market, socially excessive entry takes place because of
business-stealing e®ect which is a gain to the entrant but not to the industry
as a whole. Similarly, in a sunset industry with declining demand, now socially
excessive capacity cannnot be dissolved because everyone intends to free ride on
the reduction of industry supply expected from someone else's divestment. As a
result, no ¯rm will divest, even though divestment contributes to the saving on
¯xed costs. This paper highlights the role of mergers as a device for internalizing
the business-stealing e®ect and thereby promoting divestment, and examines if
the merger-induced divestment could improve the total welfare using the case of
cement mergers in Japan. A model of divestment based on the Markov perfect
equilibrium framework of Ericson and Pakes (1995) is estimated by an asymptotic
least squares. Then a counterfactual experiment is conducted to quantify the
welfare impact of mergers, and to show that merged ¯rms in fact divested their
facilities more and contributed to the improvement of the total welfare despite
the reduced consumers surplus.
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1 Introduction
In a so-called sunset industry that faces declining demand, the main concern is how
to dissolve the excess capacity. From an industry view point, eliminating an excess
plant is bene¯cial as it increases capacity utilization of surviving plants and saves on
the ¯xed cost associated with the plant, such as the cost of minimum labor required to
operate and maintain the plant and the rental cost of the land. If this saving on ¯xed
cost outweighs the decrease in consumer welfare, the divestment is socially bene¯cial
as well.
Yet, such divestment may not voluntarily take place in an oligopolistic industry for a
reason exactly opposite to the excess entry theorem (Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and
Suzumura and Kiyono (1987)). According to this theorem, the presence of ¯xed costs
induce entry of socially too many ¯rms. The reason is the presence of business-stealing
e®ect: the entrant gains su±cient demand partly by stealing business from incumbent
¯rms. It is a gain to the entrant but not to the industry and, in consequence, the entry
may be socially excessive.
In a sunset industry, excess capacity may not be divested for exactly the reverse
reason: each ¯rm is unwilling to divest because the gain is partly (or possibly mostly)
captured by the rival ¯rms. In other words, every ¯rm intends to free-ride on the
reduction of industry supply expected from someone else's divestment. The end result
is that no ¯rm will divest, prolonging the excess capacity situation.1
A merger can internalize this business-stealing e®ect. In a horizontal merger be-
tween A and B, post-merger A should have less incentive to reduce price and promote
sales because its stealing business from B is now internalized, bringing in no gain to
the merged ¯rm. In consequence, the merged ¯rm will reduce promotion e®orts, even-
1An interesting point is that welfare loss due to free entry declines as the socially optimal number
of entrants increases (Mankiw and Whinston (1986, example 1)). This implies that since the socially
desirable level of capacity decreases with demand decline the welfare is increasingly impaired by the
excessive capacity in declining industries.
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tually reducing the market share (Odagiri (2008)). Also, merger internalizes the e®ect
of capacity expansion on market price; that is, an output expansion caused by A's
investment hurts B's pro¯ts, thereby reducing the contributions to the merged ¯rm's
pro¯ts. In consequence, a merged ¯rm has less incentive to engage in a capacity expan-
sion race. Berry and Pakes (1993) investigated this e®ect of merger using a dynamic
oligopoly model.
A merged ¯rm can internalize the gain from divestment because B's gain from A's
divestment is now part of the ¯rm's gain. Therefore, a merger can promote divestment,
contributing to the saving of ¯xed cost and the receipt of scrap value from divestment.
Of course, the merger may also cause the price to rise and, from the social viewpoint,
the resulting loss of consumer surplus must be balanced against the saved ¯xed cost
and the received scrap value.
I highlight the role of mergers as a device for alleviating the ine±ciency of divest-
ment and investigate whether the merger-induced divestment can improve the total
welfare. For this purpose, the case of cement mergers in Japan is studied. The Japanese
cement industry provides a good example for studying the e®ect of merger in a decline
period. The industry is interpreted as a sunset industry in the sense that it has faced
the downward trend in demand. Since the burst of the bubble economy public and
private investment in construction, it is indicative for the cement consumption, has
decreased over the 1990s and settles in the level of 30 years ago. As demand has
shrunk, the industry has been forced to contract its size and become more e±cient to
survive in such severe circumstance. In the middle of phase of decline, four mergers
and one acquisition took place. After mergers, the industry has reduced its capital
assets and contracted along with the decline of demand. Whether this contraction
induced by consolidation could enhance the e±ciency and improve the welfare is the
main interest.
To evaluate the welfare e®ect of horizontal mergers, a theoretical model to capture
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the industry dynamics featured by divestment and negative shock in demand is con-
structed building on the Markov perfect equilibrium framework of Ericson and Pakes.2
The underlying parameters of the model governing divestment dynamics is estimated
by the recently developed econometric method, the asymptotic least squares coupled
with forward simulation ( Pesendorfer and Shmidt-Dengler (2008) and Bajari, Benkard
and Levin (2007)). With parameters estimates, a simulation exercise is conducted to
explore what it would have happened to the cement industry if no merger had taken
place.
The contribution of the paper is twofold. Firstly, my main interest is in a declining
industry. Since the early works by Ghemawat and Nalebu® (1985) and Fudenberg and
Tirole (1986), surprisingly few studies have been made on declining industries, despite
the fact that almost all developed nations have declining sectors and how to promote
capacity reduction in such sector is a pressing policy issue. Secondly, horizontal mergers
are evaluated form a dynamic perspective. In particular, the focus is on the e®ect of
mergers on divestment behavior and on its welfare consequence. Since Stigler (1968)
emphasized on the importance of a dynamic perspective on merger analysis, many
researchers have tried to incorporate his intention into the model. Particularly, in
recent years several theoretical models have been proposed, some of which are Berry
and Pakes (1993), Gowrisankaran (1999), Pesendorfer (2005) and Choeng and Judd
(2006). But, in spite of blossoming of theoretical and numerical studies, empirical
analyses on merger from a dynamic perspective have not been conducted except only a
few papers. To the best of my knowledge the present paper is one of the ¯rst attempts
to examine the implications of mergers employing a fully dynamic divestment model.3
In addition to the impacts on academic world, this paper also has an important
2In recent years Ericson and Pakes model is extensively used in both theoretical and empirical
Industrial Organization. See Draszelski and Pakes (2006) for applications.
3Pesendorfer (2003) develops a simple investment model re°ecting competition in the US paper
industry. While his model is inherently static one, it succeeds to capture the dynamic aspect of
investment decisions in the industry. Recently, Myojo and Ohashi (2008) investigate the merger in
the Japanese steel industry with a dynamic investment model.
4
policy implication. US horizontal merger guidelines states that \the agencies consider
merger-speci¯c, cognizable reductions in ¯xed costs, even if they cannot be expected to
result in direct short-term, procompetitive price e®ects because consumers may bene¯t
from them over the longer term even if not immediately".4 My study below will show
that a horizontal merger can facilitate divestment and thereby reduce ¯xed cost. It
will also show that this ¯xed cost savings plus sell-o® values may be a substantial
contribution to the total surplus. According to the US guidelines, such a merger will
not be accepted because, even in long run, price reduction is not expected to take
place. However, if the total surplus is to be the welfare criterion, the merger possibly
had better be accepted. My analysis, therefore, will provide a critical policy question
to the competition policy authority.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides brief information of cement
industry. Section 3 presents a theoretical model to capture the competition in the
cement industry. It allows for divestment as well as a traditional quantity setting
competition. In section 4, structural parameters of the model are estimated by the
two step method. Section 5 conducts a simulation experiment exploring what have
happened to the cement industry if any mergers had not taken place.
2 The Cement Industry in Japan
The Japanese cement industry provides a good example for studying mergers in a de-
cline period. Figure 1 shows the movements of cement consumption and governmental
and private investments in construction. Cement is the key gradient of concrete, which
is used as a ¯mm material, such as skyscrapers, roadways, railways, airports, seaports,
and other arteries of society. Therefore, the cement consumption largely depends on
construction investment in both private and public sectors as depicted in Figure 1.
4US department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, \Commentary on the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines,", March 2006, p.58.
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The cement consumption had steadily increased during the 1980s and expanded until
burst of the bubble economy. Thereafter it has been declining as the construction
investments have been shrinking and in recent years settles down in around 70% level
of its peak, which is the same amount of 30 years ago.
As the demand has shrunk, the cement industry has been contracting its size to
survive in such severe circumstance. In Figure 2 the remarkable reduction of cement
distribution facilities is observed during the period. The facility connecting cement
plants to local customers, `service station', plays the key role in the cement delivery
°ow. Once cement produced in a plant, usually it is delivered by sea to service stations
in regional markets.5 Cement service stations are scattering mainly at sea front area in
a regional market. In an individual region a cement ¯rm carries its product from service
stations to its local consumers by truck. This stage of the transportation from a service
station to consumers is called as `secondary stage delivery' whereas the transportation
from a plant to a service station is `primary stage delivery'. The transportation cost
of the secondary stage is high enough to prevent a ¯rm from delivering its product to
customers far from a service station. To avoid long haul carriages, the cement ¯rms set
up several facilities within a regional market. Through its e®ect on the transportation
cost, the number of service stations in a market determines ¯rm's supply capacity
substantially.6
Although it contributes to the expansion of its supply, operating a service station
is also a substantial burden on a cement ¯rm since variable and ¯xed costs related to
the operation are not negligible. For example, these costs include cost for keeping up a
5Cement plants locate at areas where lime stone is reserved in abundantly, e.g. Chugoku, Hokkaido
and Kyushu. Plants in such areas account for an enormous proportion of cement production in Japan.
As explained in the later section, there are eleven regional markets in Japan, Hokkaido, Tohoku, North
and South Kanto, Hokuriku, Tokai, Kansai, Chugoku, Shikoku, Kyushu and Okinawa. Cement ¯rms
are doing their business in some of or all of these regions and have a local headquarter in the regions.
6Cement ¯rms are required to bring its product to not only concrete plants of its customers but
also to customers' construction sites. Therefore they face uncertainty on the distance from their
service stations to the construction sites. Due to this nature of the cement delivery, it is likely to be
advantageous for them to have several distribution facilities in a regional market.
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°eet of cement tracks for delivery, the primary stage delivery cost, which is proportional
to the number of service stations, and a cost of minimum labor requirement for the
operation. As the demand has declined, pressure for facilities to be scrapped has been
increasingly created. In fact, it was said that the main concern was how to eliminate
its abundant facilities and to reduce the ¯xed costs to restore pro¯tability. This motive
for reducing their excessive facilities as well as achieving some e±ciency gains led the
industry to reorganization.
2.1 Mergers
In the 1990s, the Japanese cement industry has experienced its market reorganization.
Particularly the mergers listed below accelerated the market consolidation dramati-
cally.7
² 1994 Onoda Cement + Chichibu Cement ! Chihibu-Onoda Cement
² 1994 Sumitomo Cement + Osaka Cement ! Sumitomo-Osaka Cement
² 1998 Chihibu-Onoda Cement + Nihon Cement ! Taihaiyo Cement
² 1998 Mitsubishi Cement + Ube Cement ! Ube-Mitsubishi Cement8
All four mergers reduced the number of ¯rms operating in a regional market because
they involved ¯rms operating in all regional markets. Table 1 indicates that it was
reduced from nine to six on an average. Not only did the mergers reduce the number
of ¯rms, they also changed the concentration ratio largely. Table 2 reveals that three
¯rm concentration ratio (CR3) in terms of service stations rose in nearly 20% after
1994 mergers and exceeded 80% in an average by the second mergers.
7Although one acquisition, Mitsubishi's acquisition of Tohokukaihatsu, took place, its did not have
any impact on a regional competition because these two ¯rms were operating in di®erent markets each
other.
8Ube-Mitsubishi Cement is a merging sales company of Ube Cement and Mitsubishi Cement. They
have not merged their production divisions. But this paper deal with it as a merging ¯rm because we
focus on cement ¯rm's supply behavior in a market, not on a production.
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Price is also an important ¯gure in evaluating the e®ect of mergers. Figure 4
displays the price movement before and after four mergers. During the period, despite
experiencing four big mergers, the cement industry has continued to get the price down.
Although this ¯nding may be a little bit surprising, this price trend is complicated by
the downward shock in demand. Thus, in examining the price changes, it is necessary
to take such exogenous factor into account and to separate it o® from the in°uence of
the mergers.
As mentioned above, substantial reductions of distribution facilities have been ob-
served after the mergers. Figure 3 indicates that the steady decline in the total number
of service stations and also shows that the most part of the reductions by the merged
¯rms. The merged ¯rms have scrapped about 25% of their facilities. On the other hand,
non-merged ¯rms have reduced nearly 15% of their service stations. This fact may sug-
gest that the mergers a®ected ¯rms' incentive for holding facilities and prompted the
reduction of distribution facilities.
The above facts regarding the demand declining and the capacity removals will
imply the importance of evaluating mergers with an explicit consideration about a
constantly changing environment. Ignorance of such dynamic aspects of the industry
caused by endogenous and exogenous factors must lead to an erroneous implication to
mergers in a declining period.
3 Data
Of particular interest in this research is to analyze how the mergers a®ected the in-
centive for capacity removals and whether the merger induced divestment improved
the total welfare. For this purpose, the data including only after the merger wave,
1998-2006, is used. All of the data are collected from Cement year book 1998-2006.
Cement year book is published annually by Japan cement association and provides use-
ful information on ¯rm-region level activities, distribution facilities and quantities sold,
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cement prices, and public and private investments, which is a demand proxy variable.
According to Japan cement association, the cement market is divided into eleven re-
gional markets, Hokkaido, Tohoku, North and South Kanto, Hokuriku, Tokai, Kansai,
Chugoku, Shikoku, Kyushu and Okinawa. Among these regional markets, six regional
markets, Hokkaido, Tohoku, Tokai, Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku, are selected as the sam-
ple for this research. Three markets, Hokuriku, Koshin-etsu and Okinawa, are excluded
due to the lack of price information. Further two markets, Kanto and Kyushu, are also
excluded because the average sizes of service stations in these two markets are very
di®erent from other markets.9
Table 4 summarizes the data. The upper three rows are the regional market level
data. Price is the annual average price in each regional market. Cement Consumption is
the total amount of annual consumption in an individual regional market. Construction
Investment is the proxy variable for the industrywide demand shifter and it is the sum
of private and governmental investments in construction. Three variables in the lower
half of the table are the ¯rm level data in each regional market. Supply Quantity is
the amount of quantities sold by a ¯rm. No.SS is the number of service stations of a
¯rm, and Divestment is also the number of service stations scrapped by a ¯rm.
To make the estimation procedure manageable, I focus on the activities of the
largest ¯ve or four ¯rms in an individual market. Due to this, relatively small ¯rms
are excluded. However the total supply of these selected large ¯rms covers at least 85
percent of total supply in a region and the average coverage is above 95 percent of total
supply in a region during the sample period. So this data manipulation will not have
any substantial impact on the analysis.
9In Kanto region, the size of a service station is quite large, but the number of SSs is small. On
the other hand, in Kyusyu region, the situation is completely opposite. We do not know the reason,
but it implies that the value of a SS in the two regions is far di®erent from that of SS in other regions.
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4 Model
To evaluate the welfare e®ect of the mergers, it is necessary to develop a theoretical
model that captures features of the cement industry. As previously noted, an individual
cement market is localized and concentrated, and product is regarded as a homogeneous
good. Further the industry has been facing the downward trend in its demand and, as
the demand has shrunk, the cement ¯rms have been forced to reduce their distribution
facilities, service stations (hereafter SSs), to remain pro¯table. Although by selling o®
SSs the ¯rms can receive scrap value and save ¯xed costs, the part of its business is
stolen by competitors unless a scrapped distribution facility is completely abundant.
Therefore strategic interaction between cement ¯rms in a regional market is one of
the key determinants of their divestment decision process. In addition, it it natural to
consider that scrapping a SS also has a dynamic impact on future market con¯gurations.
It changes not only the number of own SSs in the subsequent periods but also the entire
state of the market through strategic interactions. As a result, the stream of future
cash °ows depends on the facility removal decision in the current period. Therefore,
in deciding whether scrapping some of SSs or not, a cement ¯rm will contemplate the
in°uence of its action on future market structure.
With these characteristics of the industry, the competition in homogeneous product
market, the dynamic divestment decision and the exogenous demand shift, a model
of oligopolistic competition in a dynamic environment is needed. Ericson and Pakes
(1995) provide an elegant framework of dynamic oligopoly which is designed to capture
the industry dynamics with heterogeneous ¯rms. Building on their Markov perfect
equilibrium framework, I construct a simple model of dynamic divestment decision
process.10
In the model each ¯rm is characterized by only its state variable and also a regional
10The model can be regarded as a simpli¯ed model of Besanko, Daraszelski, Lu and Sattherthwaite
(2008), which allows for both investment and divestment actions.
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market is completely described by a state vector consisting of ¯rms' state variables and
industrywide exogenous demand shock. At the beginning of each period ¯rms decide
simultaneously whether scrapping capacity or not, and if so, choose the number of SSs
scrapped given their beliefs on future market con¯gurations. Following the divestment
decisions, the product market competition takes place. Given their facilities, demand
level and competitors' strategies, ¯rms compete each other in quantity.At the end of the
period each ¯rm obtains pro¯t as a result of product market competition and receives
scrap value(s) if it reduced some of its SSs, and the state variables evolves following
the realizations of divestments and demand shock.
In contrast to Ericson and Pakes (1995) in which investment is a continuos vari-
able (but the state variables are still discrete), I have to consider a discrete divestment
action since the facility, SS, is indivisible. This discrete nature of divestment behav-
iors may cause the existence problem of an equilibrium of the model (Draszelski and
Satterthwaite (2007)). To avoid such problem a random scrap value is introduced into
the model, and it is assume that before ¯rms taking any actions they observe their
scrap value privately. Other than insuring the existence of an equilibrium, introducing
a privately known scrap value is justi¯ed in terms of at least the following two points.
First, in the real world, a ¯rm would face uncertainty about competitors' actions since
it can not know other competitors' cash °ows exactly. Introducing a privately known
scrap value re°ects this uncertainty. Another reason is that a dynamic stochastic
game with incomplete information can be estimated by recently developed economet-
ric methods by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007),
Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2007), and Pesendorfer and Schidt-Dengler (2008). With
the advancements in econometrics of dynamic game models, underlying parameters
of the model can be recovered from the observed data. Once underlying parameters
at hand, a counterfactual simulation can be conducted to evaluate the mergers. For
these reasons, I describe the dynamic competition in the cement industry as a dynamic
11
discrete game with incomplete information.
States As just noted, a regional cement market is assumed to be completely charac-
terized by a payo® relevant state vector. The list of state variables includes each ¯rm's
state variable and an industrywide demand shock. The ¯rm state variable are the
number of its SSs in the region. The number of SSs determines ¯rm's supply capacity
and therefore a®ects its pro¯t substantially. A demand shock is also payo® relevant
because pro¯t of each ¯rm depends on the demand condition of each period. We de¯ne
the state vector as
!t = (s1t; :::; sNt; zt) (1)
where state variable sit represents ¯rm i's number of SSs in the regional market and
zt is the demand shifter. A subscript r labeling a regional market is dropped for
expositional simplicity.
The movement of the state vector from current to next period depends on ¯rms'
decisions and the exogenous demand movement. The movements of these states are
weakly unidirectional. That is, the state variables can only move to a lower state or
remain in the current state. This re°ects the fact that the cement industry have faced
a downward shock in demand and ¯rms have continued to reduce their facilities as
the demand declines. Therefore, an upward move in the state variables need not be
considered.11
The number of SSs in the next period depends on whether ¯rm divests its facilities
and how many it scraps. If ¯rm i scraped dit of it's own SSs, the number of SSs in the
11The unidirectional movement of the state variables can often lead to the uniqueness of equilibria
of the model, like the case of Cabral and Riodan (1994) or Besanko, Draszelski, Lu and Satterthwaite
(2008).
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next period is
sit+1 = sit ¡ dit (2)
where sit+1 is the number of SSs in next period and dit is the number of SSs scrapped
in the current period. This facility adjustment is assumed to take one year and depre-
ciation is not considered. The demand shock moves stochastically to a lower demand
level or remains in the current level. In contrast to ¯rm's capital stock, it is assumed
to evolve exogenously.
Timing All actions are made as a function of the state variables in the beginning
of the period. Each ¯rm makes divestment decision at ¯rst given its beliefs on other
¯rms' strategies and on future market condition after observing the demand shock and
knowing scrap value of its SS privately. Once the divestment decisions are made, ¯rms
compete against each other in the product market . At the end of the period, each ¯rm
obtains pro¯t resulting from the product market competition and receives scrap value
if it scraped some of its SSs. Then the state variables evolves following the actions and
the realization of demand shock.
The sequence of events in each period unfolds as follows:
1. Each ¯rm knows its scrap value privately and observes the demand level at the
current state.
2. Each ¯rm makes the divestment decision (decides the number of SSs in the next
period).
3. Given the current state variables (the number of SSs and the demand level), ¯rms
compete each other over quantities.
4. Each ¯rm obtains the per-period pro¯t and receives scrap value(s) if it sold o®
some of its SSs.
13
5. The state vector evolves as the divestments are completed and the demand moves.
Cash°ow The per-period cash°ow is composed by two terms, product market pro¯t
and scrap value. Pro¯t from product market is the result of quantity competition given
the current market con¯guration. Each ¯rm receives scrap value(s) if it scraped it's
own SSs. Thus a per-period cash°ow of ¯rm i at state !t can be written by
¼it(!t) = uit(!t) + Áit ¤ dit: (3)
uit(!) is a product market pro¯t including ¯xed cost fss and Áit is scrap value. The
main part of scrap value is the sell-o® value of land and the ¯xed cost is the cost of
minimum labor and equipments required to operate a SS, e.g. a °eet of cement trucks.
Privately known scrap value Áit is assumed to follow the normal distribution with mean
¹ and variance k2 and to be independent across ¯rms and periods.
Product market competition and pro¯t Given the current state !t, ¯rms com-
pete each other in quantity in the product market. The product market pro¯t function
is written by
uit(!t) = P (Qt)qit ¡ C(sit; qit) (4)
where P (Qt) is the inverse demand function, C(sit; qit) is the cost function depending
on the number of SSs, sit, and the quantity supplied, qit. The inverse demand function
with constant price elasticity is assumed:
P (Qt) = A0Q
®1
t z
®2
t (5)
where zt is a demand shock and is treated as a state variable and A0 contains a time
invariant market speci¯c e®ect on price.
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As explained previously, the transportation cost is assumed to be in°uenced by the
number of SSs hold in a market and, as a result, the amount of supply quantity is also
a®ected by it. Therefore ¯rm i's cost function is expressed as a function of its own
state variable sit and quantity qit:
C(sit; qit) = A3s
®4
it qit + fsssit (6)
where A3 includes a region speci¯c shift parameter and it is assumed constant over time.
If ®4 is negative (and in fact it is estimated to be negative in the later section), ¯rm i
faces the lower marginal cost of transporting its product to customer as it has the larger
number of SSs. The lower marginal cost can be achieved mainly since if a ¯rm keeps
the larger number of facilities in a region it can manage cement distribution among
facilities and avoid costly long haul carriages. fss is ¯xed cost and is proportional to
the own state variable sit.
Cournot Nash equilibrium in the product market competition is assumed and the
outcome itself has no e®ect on actions from the current period on. By this so-called
`static-dynamic' breakdown assumption, the per-period pro¯t ui(!) can be computed
o® the algorithm for solving an equilibrium of the model.12
Divestment decision and Value function Now I turn into the decision process of
removing facilities. Since the divestment decision in the current period a®ects market
structure in the subsequent periods, it can change the stream of future cash °ows.
Therefore it is natural to assume that ¯rm's divestment decision has the dynamic
nature in contrast to the determination of per-period supply quantity and each ¯rm
thus takes its facility reduction decision to maximize the discounted expected future
cash °ows given its beliefs on competitors' actions and the future market conditions.
12In other words, the per-period pro¯t function can be treated as a primitive of the model when
solving an equilibrium.
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To analyze the decision process in such a complex environment, the strategy space
is focused on Markov class (Maskin and Tirole (2001)). In Markov strategies the past
in°uences the current actions only though its e®ect on the current state variables that
summarizes the direct e®ect of the past actions on the current state. Formally, the
Markov strategy mapping state variables and a private shock to actions is expressed as
di = d(!; Ái); di 2 Di. In this study an action di 2 Di is discrete due to the indivisible
nature of SS.
The ¯rm's decision problem is to choose the number of SS scrapped at the current
period with consideration about it's e®ect on the future cash °ow stream given its
belief on future market con¯gurations. Given actions follow a Markov strategy, the
optimal divestment decision of ¯rm i at state ! is de¯ned recursively by the solution
to the following Bellman equation:
Vi(!; Ái;¾i) = ui(si; s¡i; z)
+ max
di2Di
n
diÁi + ¯
X
s0¡i;z0
Vi(si ¡ di; s0¡i; z0; ¾i)gi(s0¡i; si; s¡i; z)q(z0jz)
o
(7)
where ¯ is discount factor and the summation is taken over all of the one-period
reachable states of other ¯rms and demand from the current state. V (s0i; s
0
¡i; z
0)i is
¯rm i's expected value function at a state ! before observing a scrap value and it is
de¯ned as Vi(s
0
i; s
0
¡i; z) =
R
Vi(si ¡ di; s0¡i; z0; Á0i)dF (Á0i): For expositional convenience,
the components of the state vector, (si; s¡i; z), are explicitly expressed. gi(s0¡i; si; s¡i; z)
is ¯rm i's perceived state transition probabilities from the current state, (si; s¡i; z), to
the next state of competitors, s0¡i. It can be written by the product of the ¯rm's beliefs
on competitors' actions d¡i at state !:
gi(s
0
¡i; si; s¡i; z) =
Y
¡i
¾i(d¡ijsi; s¡i; z): (8)
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where s0¡i = s¡i¡d¡i. q(z0jz) is the transition probability of the demand shock shifting
from the current demand level to the next state.
To express the decision rule in a simpler way, let W (dij!) be the weighted average
of the expected value functions when ¯rm i takes an action di at the current state,
W (dij!) =
X
s0¡i;z0
Vi(si ¡ di; s0¡i; z0;¾i)gi(s0¡i; d¡i; si; s¡i; z)q(z0jz): (9)
At the beginning of each period ¯rm i knows scrap value of it's SS privately, and it
chooses the number of SSs scrapped in that period comparing the scrap value with the
di®erentials in the future expected value functions by the reductions of its facilities.
This optimal decision problem is expressed in the following way:
di =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if ¯
¡
W (0j!)¡W (1j!)¢ ¸ Ái
a(1 · a < ¹a) if ¯¡W (a¡ 1j!)¡W (ajs)¢ < Ái · ¯¡W (aj!)¡W (a+ 1j!)¢
¹a if ¯
¡
W (¹aj!)¡W (¹a¡ 1j!)¢ > Ái:
(10)
A di®erence between W (¢j!)s denotes a cuto® point. If ¯rm i received scrap value
below the ¯rst cuto® point, it does not do anything and keeps the current facilities
in the next period. Otherwise, divestment is done according to the above decision
rule (10). For example, if its scrap value was beyond the ¯rst cuto® point but not
above the second point, ¯rm i would reduce only one SS. Or, if it fall between the
second cuto® point and the third, ¯rm i scraps two SSs. Thus the divestment decision
rule maximizing the future pro¯t is expressed as the cuto® strategy depending on the
realization of private scrap value and the value function di®erentials.
The cuto® decision rule can be expressed alternatively by the probability that each
action can be taken. Let P (dij!) be the probability that ¯rm i divests di unit of it's
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own SSs in the state !:
P (dij!) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
R ¯((W (0j!)¡W (1j!))
¡1 dF (Ái) if di = 0R ¯(W (dij!)¡W (di+1j!))
¯(W (di¡1j!)¡W (dij!)) dF (Ái) if 1 · di < ¹aR1
¯(W (dij!)¡W (di¡1j!)) dF (Ái) if di = ¹a:
(11)
The last remaining component of the model is the expected value function Vi(si; s¡i; z).
It can be obtained by integrating over Ái on both sides of (7).
Vi(!;¾i) = ui(si; s¡i; z)
+
X
di
P (dijsi; s¡i; z)
n
diE[Áijsi; s¡i; z] + ¯W (dijsi; s¡i; z)
o
(12)
E[Áij!] is the expectation of scrap value conditioning on scraping di of SSs.13 Once
the expected value functions are at hand, ¯rms i's optimal choice can be obtained by
(10) or (11).
The expression of (12) is very useful. By integrating out scrap value, it is possible
to eliminate the continuous state variable Ái from the state variables vector. Conse-
quently the computational disadvantage due to the introduction of private information
disappears (Draszelski and Satterthwaite (2007)).
Equilibrium The equilibrium concept of this model is Markov perfect Nash. A
Markov perfect Nash equilirium (MPNE) insures that at each state each ¯rm chooses
optimal action given its beliefs on future market structure and those beliefs are consis-
tent with the actions of other competitors.
13The expected scrap value of SS conditional on scrapping di of SSs is calculated by
whereE[Áij!] =
(
[P (dij!)]¡1
R
Á ¢ 1[¯¡Wdi¡1 ¡Wdi j¢ < Ái · ¯¡Wdi ¡Wdi+1¢]dF (Ái) if 0 < di < ¹a
[P (dij!)]¡1
R
Á ¢ 1[Wdi ¡Wdi¡1 > Á]dF (Ái) if di = ¹a
;
where Wdi is W (dij!).
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Following Pesendorfer and Shmidt-Dengler (2008), I set the equilibrium system of
this model. The choice probabilities of (11) can be described by the equation system
P = ª(V(¾)). P is a vector of the optimal choice probabilities for all states and ¯rms,
and V is a vector of the expected value functions and it is the function of ¾, which is a
vector of ¯rms' beliefs on competitors' actions. ª is a function that characterizes the
best responses. Since in equilibrium the ¯rm's beliefs are consistent with the choice
probabilities, an MPNE can be characterized as a ¯xed-point in the equation system:
P¤ = ª(V(P¤)): (13)
As stated in Proposition 1 in Pesendorfer and Shmidt-Dengler (2008), the equation
system (13) is a necessary and also a su±cient condition for an MPNE. Not only
does it characterize the set of equilibria, it can be exploited to recover the underlying
parameters of the model governing the facility reduction decisions.
5 Estimation
The goal in this section is to estimate the underlying parameters governing dynamics
in the theoretical model. Target parameters can be divided in two types: static pa-
rameters and dynamic parameters. Static parameters govern the static competition
and determine the per-period pro¯t. These parameters including demand and cost
function parameters can be recovered without any di±culties by commonly used esti-
mation techniques. On the other hand, since dynamic parameters have to be inferred
from ¯rm's dynamic decision process, the estimation of these parameters involving
computing value functions many times is often a computationally tough task (see Rust
(1987, 1994), Pakes (1986) and Pakes (1994)).
However, in recent years, innovative econometric techniques which can settle the
computational problem in estimating dynamic decision models have been developed
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(Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007), Pakes, Ostro-
vsky (2007) and Berry (2007) and Pesendorfer and Schidt-Dengler (2008)). Those
estimation methods can avoid or mitigate the time-consuming value function compu-
tations by exploiting observed (equilibrium) actions. In this paper to estimate the
structural parameters I use an asymptotic least squares proposed by Pesendorfer and
Shmidt-Dengler (2008) and implement their estimator coupled with forward simulation
technique by Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007). The basic procedures of the estima-
tion are the following two steps. 1) Under the assumptions that the observed data are
generated from a single MPNE pro¯le and that the equilibrium selection mechanism
is same across all regional markets, the policy functions and the equilibrium beliefs
can be recovered, and the value functions can be approximated by averaging many
simulated paths generated by the estimated policy functions.14 2) The parameters
of interest are set to match the observed choice probabilities at each state with the
outcomes predicted from the theoretical model.
Let Vi(!jd(!; Á); µ) be the expected value function of ¯rm i at state ! under the
parameter values of µ given ¯rms following the Markov strategy d. Then it can be
de¯ned as the sum of future values of pro¯t ¼i(!t;d(!t; Át); Áit; µ) from starting state
!:
Vi(!;d(!; Á); µ) = E
· 1X
t=0
¯t¼i(!t;d(!t; Át); Áit; µ)
¯¯
!0 = !; µ
¸
: (14)
The expectations over the current and future private values and the future states.
Forward simulation approximates the above expected value function by averaging many
simulated paths of in¯nite future pro¯t streams starting from !. As will be explained,
the optimal choice rule at each state d(!; Á) can be expressed by a function of the
choice probabilities P(dj!) and therefore the value functions can be also a function of
14See Berry and Tamer (2006) for detailed discussions on the issues of multiple equilibria and the
equilibrium selection mechanisms and their critique on the common equilibrium assumption across
di®erent markets.
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the choice probabilities. That is, with estimates of the choice probabilities and forward
simulation, the equilibrium value functions can be estimated as V^(P^¤; µ).
The asymptotic least squares principle consists of estimating parameters of interest
µ by forcing the equilibrium constraints
g(V^(P^¤); µ) = P^¤ ¡ª(V^(P^¤; µ); µ) = 0 (15)
to be satis¯ed approximately (Pesendorfer and Shmidt-Dengler (2008)). P^¤ is a vector
of the observed probabilities and ª(¢) is a vector of the equilibrium choice probabilities
predicted by the model. The relationship between the parameters of interest and
auxiliary parameters g(¢) is called as an asymptotic model. The asymptotic least
squares problem is to ¯nd parameters minimizing the distance of g(¢) to zero in a
metric of a given weighting matrix.
5.1 First Step Estimation
In the ¯rst step demand function and cost function is estimated to recover parameters
governing the quantity competition and obtain the per-period pro¯t function. Then
the equilibrium policy function can be estimated from the observed equilibrium play
at each state. With these estimates, the equilibrium value function can be calculated
by averaging many simulated equilibrium paths.
Demand Function To estimate demand function, the region-year observations of
quantities sold and prices are used. The static demand function at each regional market
is de¯ned by
log(Qt) = ®0 ¡ ®1log(Pt) + ®2log(zt) + ²t; (16)
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where Pt is price at time t, Qt is quantity sold, and zt is private and public spending in
construction.15 I estimate the demand function parameter values by 2SLS. Instruments
are one period lagged endogenous variables. The transition probability of demand
shifter zt should be also estimated. But, unfortunately, due to the data limitation this
is impossible. Therefore, we assume that it moves to a lower state from the current
state with probability 0.7 and stays forever once it reaches the demand level of 2006.
Cost Function Since cost side variables are proprietary to ¯rms and inherently
di±cult to obtain, the straightforward estimation like the demand function can not
be done. Therefore, to estimate cost function, an assumption on the product market
competition has to be imposed.16 The equilibrium concept used here is Cournot Nash.
In Cournot game ¯rms determine their quantities to maximize the per-period pro¯t
function given other ¯rms' quantities. The predicted marginal costs are obtained form
the set of ¯rst order conditions of ¯rms in the market:
mcit = Pt(Qt) +
@Pt(Qt)
@qit
qit: (17)
As demand function parameters have already been obtained, the marginal cost of each
¯rm can be estimated. Then as if it was observed it the marginal cost function, which
is assumed to depends on the number of SSs hold within a region, sit, can be estimated
by OLS:
log(m^cit) = ®3 + ®4log(sit) + ²it: (18)
15The subscript r labeling a regional market is dropped.
16Estimating cost function parameters by imposing an assumption on an equilibrium behavior is
common in the literature, e.g. Berry et al. (1995). Recently, Rosen (2007) propose an alternative
approach where any equilibrium assumption is not imposed. By applying the concept of partial
identi¯cation, he places bounds to estimate a marginal cost. Such approach is quite interesting but I
do not pursue it here.
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Market speci¯c e®ects on the marginal cost are also included. An unobserved cost shock
²it is assumed to be i.i.d and not considered as a state variable here for simplicity.
Before proceeding to estimation of policy function, a clear drawback in this esti-
mation procedure should be noted. Fixed cost fss can not be identi¯ed because it is
dropped out from the ¯rst order condition. Unfortunately we do not have the data
about the minimum cost required to operate a SS annually. Therefore, as explained
in the later section, my estimates of parameters of the scrap value distribution would
include the amount of the future savings of ¯xed costs.
Divestment Policy Function The last empirical object in the ¯rst step is the
equilibrium policy function governing divestment behaviors. The theoretical model
suggests that the equilibrium policy function should be a function of the current state
variable and a random scrap value. Further it is a cuto® strategy due to the indivisible
nature of the facility, SS. The cuto® strategy means the policy function is weakly
increasing in Ái rather than strictly increasing.
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The weakly increasing policy function does not allow me to use straightforwardly
the method of Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007), in which a policy function strictly
increasing in private shock is considered. Therefore I employ an alternative approach
to estimate the policy function. This approach proceeds ¯rst to estimate the choice
probability of all possible actions at each state from the data and, then, to calculate
the equilibrium cuto® points by inverting the estimated distribution function at each
state. These equilibrium cuto® points correspond to the equilibrium policy rule.
Let G(dij!) be the probability that ¯rm i takes action less than or equal to di.
Following the theoretical model, this cumulative distribution function can be written
17In related work Olley and Pakes (1996) use a nonparametrics to get around the problem of
computing value function needed to obtain a policy function. They describe a policy function as a
higher order function of state variables without solving the complex dynamic programming problem
to control for unobserved productivity shock.
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as
G(dij!) =
Z ¹Wdi (!)
¡1
dF (Á;¹; k2)
= F ( ¹Wdi(!);¹; k
2) (19)
where ¹Wdi(!) = ¯
¡
W (dij!)¡W (di + 1j!)
¢
represents the cuto® point in which ¯rm i
is indi®erent between divesting di unit of its SSs and one more unit than di and ¹ and
k are unknown parameter of the distribution of F . Inverting the above equation, the
cuto® point can be expressed as a function of the probability G(dij!):
¹Wdi(!) = F
¡1(G(dij!);¹; k2): (20)
This cuto® point can be interpreted as the equilibrium policy rule itself; when ¯rm i
knows its scrap value beyond this level, it does divest di unit of its SSs. If the cuto®
points at each state are estimated and the distribution of private value is known, how
¯rms will behave at each state can be predicted.
To estimate the equilibrium policy function, this approach needs only to estimate
the probability G(dij!) at each state and the knowledge of the distribution F . While
optimal estimator for G(dij!) would be a simple nonparametric description what the
¯rm does at every state, the choice probability is estimated parametrically by a count
data regression of Hauseman, Hall and Griliches (1984) and obtain the cumulative
probability distribution function at each state G(dij!; °). This parametric approach
is chosen over a non-parametric spell frequency estimator because of the sample size
used in this study.With the estimated probabilities of all possible actions at each state,
the cuto® points can be calculated, and a randomly drawn scrap value determines the
divestment behavior based on the cuto® points.
In estimating the policy function, it is important to control for unobserved state
variables. Due to the presence of the unobserved state variables, a di®erent equilibrium
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can arise in di®erent markets even if these two markets are observationally equal. When
using the sample including several markets, controlling for the unobserved market
speci¯c e®ects is particularly essential for obtaining consistent estimates of the policy
function. Therefore I include market speci¯c e®ects controlling for the e®ect of these
unobservables on the observed equilibrium behaviors with the assumption that the
unobserved state variables are constant over time.
Value Functions The key point of the two step estimation procedure is to estimate
the equilibrium value functions by using the estimated policy function. Since the equi-
librium value functions can be exploited to estimate the dynamic structural parameters
in the next step, they are the most important ingredients in the estimation. I estimate
the value functions by averaging many simulated paths starting at observed states,
which are generated by the estimated policy function. This technique is known as
forward simulation which is initiated by Hotz, Miller, Smith and Sanders (1994), and
extended to multiple agents' decision problems by Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007).
Given a starting state, each simulation path is generated in the following steps:
1. Set a starting state !0 = !.
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2. Draw scrap values Ái(Á¡i) from the standard normal distribution and determine
actions di(d¡i).
3. Calculate the per-period pro¯t ui(!).
4. Update the ¯rms' state variables and the demand level following the divestment
decisions and the demand transition probability.
5. Repeat the step 1-4 for T periods.
18All the value functions at both the observed states and one period reachable states from those
states are estimated. The maximum number of SSs scrapped at a period is restricted to four, which
is the maximum of the observed divestment behaviors. Even if ¯rms were allowed to divest its SSs
more than four units, the estimated cumulative probability G(dj!; °^) approaches to one until d = 4
in almost all states. So this restriction will be innocuous.
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The equilibrium value functions are estimated by averaging 200 paths per each starting
state constructed by the above manner. Each path has the length in 100 periods and
discount factor ¯ is set 0.925. Instead of (pseudo) random draws, draws from Halton
sequence are used to reduce the computational burden while keeping the value function
approximations precise. According to Train (2003), since they have superior coverage
properties and smaller simulation errors, Halton draws are far more e®ective for a
simulation estimator than (pseudo) random draws. The expected value function of
¯rm i starting from ! can be approximated by
1
H
HX
h=1
· 1X
t=0
¯t¼^hi (!t; d^(!t; Át); Áit; µ)j!0 = !; µ
¸
:
H is the number of draws form Halton sequence.19
5.2 Second Step Estimation
In the second step, by exploiting the equilibrium conditions, the dynamic structural
parameters are recovered, which are the mean ¹ and variance k2 of the scrap value
distribution. But, as explained in the previous section, the estimated pro¯t function
doesn't include ¯xed cost fss. Therefore, the amount of future savings on ¯xed costs
19To reduce the computational burden the linearity assumption in payo® function is exploited.
Recall the per-period cash°ow is
¼^i(!t; µ) = u^it + Áitd^it
= u^it + (¹+ kºit) ¤ d^it:
u^it is the product market pro¯t and d^it is the number of SSs scrapped, which depends on the choice
probability estimates G(dij!; °^). Notice the unknown parameters (¹; k) are enter linearly in the per-
period cash°ow. Therefore, the expected value function of ¯rm i starting from ! can be rewritten
by
V^i(!; µ) =
1
H
HX
h=1
· 1X
t=0
¯tu^hit(!t) + ¹
1X
t=0
¯td^hit + k
1X
t=0
d^hitº
h
it
¸
= »i(!; d^) ¢ µ (21)
where »(!; d) = ( 1H
PH
h=1
P1
t=0 ¯
tu^hi (!t);
1
H
PH
h=1
P1
t=0 ¯
td^hit;
1
H
PH
h=1
P1
t=0 d^
h
itº
h
it) and µ = (1; ¹; k).
By this linearity, the computation of the value functions are done only at once.
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by the reduction of a SS at the current period will be contained into estimates of the
mean and variance of the scrap value distribution (¹; k2). In estimating the structural
parameters I have to recognize this point. The best thing I can do here is to obtain
parameter estimates of (~¹; ~k2), not (¹; k2). In the later section we will try to separate
¯xed cost from the estimates (~^¹; ~^k2) by utilizing an additional information.
Let µ = (~¹; ~k2) a vector of the parameters of interest. De¯ne the equilibrium
condition at a state !
P ¤D!(°^j!)¡ª¡V^ D!(P¤(°^); ®^; µj!); µ¢ = 0: (22)
P ¤D!(°^j!) is a vector of probabilities of possible actions at ! and V D!(P¤(°^); ®^; µj!)
is a vector of estimated value functions at states that are reachable in one period
from the current state. D! indicates the choice set at state !.
20 The estimated value
functions depend on the ¯rst stage estimates, the choice probabilities P¤(°^) and the
pro¯t function parameters ®^, and the parameters of interest, µ.
The asymptotic least square estimator µ^(W ) is a solution to the problem minimizing
the metric of sample counterpart to the orthogonality condition:
min
µ
£
g(°^; ®^; µ)
¤0
W
£
g(°^; ®^; µ)
¤
(23)
where g(°^; ®^; µ) = P¤(°^)¡ª¡V^(P¤(°^); ®^; µ); µ¢. The weighting matrix W used here is¡P
!
P
iD!i)-square identity matrix. In general asymptotic least squares estimators
depend on the choice of weighting matrix and this identity matrix is not the optimal
weighting matrix. But Pesendorfer and Shmidt-Dengler (2008) shows in their Monte
Carlo study that in a relatively small sample size the simple identity weighting matrix
is preferred over the optimal one. All observed states across six markets are used to
estimate the dynamic parameters, which are assumed to be the same value across these
20As previously noted, the maximum number of SSs scrapped is restricted to four.
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markets.
The variance-covariance matrix of µ^ is complicated since it depends on the variances
of the ¯rst stage parameters estimates ®^ and °^ (Newey and McFadden (1994)). Further
the value functions V is approximated by simulation method, simulation error also
a®ects the variance of structural parameter estimates µ^ (McFadden (1989) and Pakes
and Pollard (1989)). Accounting for these in°uences, the estimates of variance and
covariance matrix ­ is given by
¡
1 +
1
H
¢£
GµWGµ
¤¡1
GµWVWGµ
£
GµWGµ
¤¡1
(24)
whereH is the number of simulation draws from Halton sequence andGµ = rµg(°; ®; µ)
and
V = fg(°; ®; µ) +r°g(°; ®; µ)(°^ ¡ °) +r®g(°; ®; µ)(®^¡ ®)g
£fg(°; ®; µ) +r°g(°; ®; µ)(°^ ¡ °) +r®g(°; ®; µ)(®^¡ ®)g0: (25)
6 Estimation Results
I have described the model of dynamic oligopoly and the estimation procedure by the
two-step approach which can circumvent the problems arising in the estimation of a
dynamic decision model. This section presents the results of the estimation.
6.1 Results of the First Step Estimation
Demand Function Table 6 shows the results of demand function estimation. In
estimating demand function, one period lagged values of price and quantity sold are
served as the instrumental variables. To control for market speci¯c e®ects on quantity,
dummy variables for regional markets are also included. The estimated price coe±cient
®1 has an expected sign and its value of 1.3 falls within a reasonable range. All of the
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region speci¯c e®ects are signi¯cant and so demand conditions are di®erent across six
regions. The amount of nationwide construction investments is used as the demand
shifter in all regional markets. The regional level of investments in construction could
be used, but it almost perfectly correlates with regional quantity. Due to this the
price elasticity could not be estimated reasonably. Therefore the demand shifter is
considered to account for the nationwide trend of cement demand while the ¯xed
e®ects are indicating the demand levels of individual markets.
Cost Function Parameter estimates of cost function are presented in Table 7. As
expected, the more SSs it have within a region, a cement ¯rm can reduce it's marginal
cost of delivering product since it is likely to avoid a long haul carriage by its distribu-
tion management across own SSs. Adjusted R-square in the estimation is around 0.78
and indicates the ¯t of this speci¯cation is reasonably good.
Further to check how the model can predict the observed outcomes, Cournot equi-
librium in each region at each year is solved by estimated demand and cost functions,
and then the model predictions are compared with the observed quantities. The re-
sult is in Table 8. The model can predict the observed quantities quite well in upper
quantiles although in lower quantiles the predictions are imprecise. I are optimistic
about this result despite such prediction errors in the lower quantiles. This is because
such poor predictions in lower quantities will have a very limited impact on the total
quantities and the producers surplus (and of course on the consumers surplus) since
the share of small ¯rms is very tiny. The important thing is that the model can predict
very well relatively larger ¯rms' quantity-setting behaviors. This is essential for our
research.
Policy Function To obtain the equilibrium policy rule, at ¯rst, the probabilities of
observing all possible actions at each state are estimated by count data regression and
the cumulative probabilities are calculated. Then, a cuto® point ¹Wdi(!) are calculated
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by inverting the (standard) normal distribution and evaluating the inverted distribution
at the point of G(dij!; °^) in the way proposed in the previous section.
Table 9 presents the result of poisson regression. I regress each ¯rm action on
the state variables, own number of SSs, competitors' number of SSs and exogenous
demand shock. Also market ¯xed e®ects are considered to control for an unobserved
state variable which a®ects the equilibrium behavior.
Table 10 summarizes the prediction precision of the estimated policy rule. The
percentage of each action predicted by the estimated policy rule is compared with
the observed actions. I draw 100 scrap values from the standard normal distribution
per each ¯rm at each period and calculate the frequencies of actions. For the sake
of comparison, the same exercise is conducted by using extreme value distribution.
Table 10 shows the normal distribution can predict divestment behaviors better than
the extreme value distribution. The correlation coe±cient also supports the normal
distribution.
6.2 Result of the Second Step Estimation
In the second step we search for the values of parameters, ~¹ and ~k, minimizing the
distance between the observed divestment behaviors and the model predictions. Param-
eter estimates of the scrap value distribution are presented in Table 11. The estimates
shows the distribution is very tight, but the variance is not estimated signi¯cantly.
This result implies that cement ¯rms are very sure about scrap values and savings on
¯xed cost of other competitors' SSs and they encounters small uncertainty about their
rivals' capacity removal decisions. A convincing explanation on this result will be that
land price be a very good proxy for a sell-o® value and ¯rms can estimate their values
of removing a SS from such easily accessible information.
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Fixed cost As mentioned earlier, the ¯xed cost of holding a SS, fss, can not be
identi¯ed and therefore estimates of the scrap value distribution contains the sum of
savings on ¯xed cost from the period of removing a SS on. I try to resolve this problem
with the additional data on land price and two reasonable assumptions. First, it is
assumed that only the mean of scrap distribution contains the value of reducing a SS
and the variance is not a®ected. This implies that uncertainty among players comes
from only a privately known scrap value as de¯ned in the theoretical model. Second,
the most of the scrap value is assumed to be land price. Thus estimate of the mean ~¹
can be understood as the sum of the land price and the future streams of savings on
¯xed cost from the date of removing a SS on. With the assumptions and the data on
the land price, the per-period ¯xed cost fss can be separated out from ~^¹.
The median of land prices in six regions over the sample period is 100,000 yen
per square meter and the average size of SSs is 10,000 square meters.21 Therefore
the implied sell-o® value is ten billion yen. Then the average value of saving on ¯xed
cost can be calculated by (1 ¡ ¯) £ (~^¹ ¡ 10B). This value can be understood as the
per-period ¯xed cost and it is about 30 million yen.
7 Simulation Exercise
In previous sections we have proposed a model of facility-reducing behaviors in dynamic
environment and recovered its underlying parameters. Once structural parameters gov-
erning dynamics are recovered, an experimental exercise can be conducted by solving
an MPNE under hypothetical market structures. The interest lies in evaluating the
welfare impacts of horizontal mergers. To quantify the e®ect of horizontal mergers on
consumers, producers and total welfare, this experimental exercise considers a coun-
terfactual environment where any mergers do not take place and compares the market
21The ¯gure is the median of land prices of industrial areas and they are collected from o±cial
announcement of land price by Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. The average
area of SS is calculated from annual securities reports of Taiheiyo cement and Sumitomo-Osaka cement.
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outcomes with outcomes from a market with mergers.
Ideally the counterfactual market should have the same number of ¯rms as the
real world market had before mergers. But the computational burden for solving an
MPNE can not allow me to conduct such complete experiment.22 Therefore we consider
a market with seven independent ¯rms as a counterfactual environment and compare
it with another where three of the seven ¯rms are involved in mergers.
Even in a moderate market size, solving the theoretical model is computationally
demanding. A very useful algorithm for computing equilibria of stochastic dynamic
games is provided by Pakes and McGuire (1994) and it becomes a common tool for
applied researchers in the ¯eld.23 Although their algorithm could be applied, an alter-
native way exploiting the unique structure of the model considered here can alleviate
the computational burden slightly. In this model the movements of the state variables
are weakly unidirectional. The number of ¯rms' SSs only goes down and the demand
level also goes to a lower level, and once the states reach to a terminal state, this state
lasts forever. Therefore the value functions in the terminal state can be easily calcu-
lated because they are just the sum of future cash °ows at the states, and then the
remaining states can be solved by a backward induction procedure.24 This backward
induction can save the computational time.
Once solving the model in both the experimental environments and obtaining the
policy functions, I can make simulation paths in two starting con¯gurations. The
starting state in the counterfactual market without any mergers is based on the average
size of the largest seven ¯rms in the observed six markets at 1993, the year just before
the merger wave. The state vector starts at ! = (11; 10; 9; 8; 7; 4; 4; z). Another market
22In 1993 (just before four big mergers) the average number of ¯rms operating in a market is about
nine. The state space will be too large to solve an equilibrium of the model.
23Pakes and McGuire (2001) propose a stochastic algorithm to break the `curse of dimensionality'
in solving equilibria of a recurrent class model. Although their algorithm can deal with the large
number of ¯rms, the model considered in this study does not belong to this class.
24This algorithm is completely opposite to that of Judd, Schmeddes and Yeltekin (2006). They
consider a patent race where the state variables only go up to the higher states.
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with four mergers starts at ! = (21; 15; 9; 8; z). This starting state is based on the fact
that if all observed mergers had occurred in 1994 the average shares of merged ¯rms
in terms of SSs would have been 40%, 25% and 15% at that time.25 The observed
construction investment in 1994 is used as the starting demand level z for both markets.
This experimental exercise approximately tells about what would have happened to the
cement industry if any mergers had not taken place.
The results are summarized in Table 12. 100 sample paths having length of ten
years for each market are generated and the sample average of these paths is reported.
Consumer surplus is based on equation (5). Producer surplus is based on equation (4),
but does not include ¯xed costs. Fixed cost indicates the sum of ¯xed cost incurred
and Scrap value is the total sell-o® values of SSs. Total welfare measures the sum of
consumer surplus, producer surplus, ¯xed costs and scrap values. The last column in
the table displays the following e®ects of mergers. The mergers decreases consumer
surplus by 15.60 billion yen. On the other hand, it increases producer surplus by 24
billion yen. Furthermore, the market with mergers saves ¯xed cost by 0.8 billion yen
by the reduction of SSs and receives scrap values of 9.5 billion yen more than the
counterfactual market. The total welfare e®ect of mergers is 18.63 billion yen.26
The result reveals that the mergers increase the total welfare. The large part of
the positive welfare e®ect stems from an increase in the producers surplus while as
easily expected the consumers surplus is decreased by the mergers. As a ¯rm gets
bigger it can coordinate their supply among its SSs and reduce the transportation
cost by avoiding long haul carriages. Therefore the merged ¯rm can enjoy the cost
e±ciency gain substantially. This e±ciency gain is large enough to overwhelm the loss
of the consumers surplus. Further, the third and fourth elements in Table 12 shows
the fact that ¯rms in the merged market scraps SSs more than ¯rms do in another
25A same ¯rm was involved in merger twice.
26But, the magnitude is extremely small. The mergers can improve total welfare only by less than
2% points in this experment.
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market. Eventually, ¯rms receive more scrap values and pay less of ¯xed costs in
the market with mergers and these two e®ects also contribute to the improvement of
the producers welfare. Surprisingly, the total amount of these two values exceeds the
welfare improvement measured by the di®erence between the consumers surplus and
the producers surplus. As pointed out in Stigler (1968) and more formally in Berry
and Pakes (1993), this result emphasizes the importance of taking into account the
e®ects of outcomes arising from the dynamic decision process on the total welfare in
evaluating mergers.
So why does the merging ¯rms scrap more? Divesting facilities can be regarded as
a public good that must be provided privately. The resulting high price caused by the
reduction of a facility is bene¯cial for all market participants and ¯rms thus have the
incentive for free-riding on someone else's divestment. Merged ¯rms can internalize
this spill-over e®ect of divestment partially. Consider that a ¯rm, A, merges one of
competitors, B. Suppose that after the merger the merged ¯rm scraps one of its SSs
and raises the equilibrium price. In this case, the bene¯t of the high price enjoyed
by ¯rm B(A) is completely for ¯rm A(B)'s own pro¯t. The merged ¯rm can partially
internalize the business-stealing e®ect and, as a result, has the stronger incentive for
divesting facility than a non-merged ¯rm has.
The experiment shows that the merger induced facility removals can improve the
total welfare. The main reason of this result is that an MPNE will fail to attain
the socially desirable level of facilities in spirit of Mankiw and Whinston (1986). In an
oligopolistic industry a facility is held partly or possibly mostly by the business-stealing
motive and can contribute to the total welfare only partly. If the sum of saving on ¯xed
cost and sell-o® value exceeds its contribution to the welfare, removing a facility can
be bene¯cial. However, such divestment is not likely to be provided voluntarily for the
above reason, and the excess facilities remain. The internalization e®ect by mergers
can dissolve this and, as a result, the merger-indeuced divestment can achieve a higher
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welfare level.27
An important point is that the welfare loss due to the excessive facilities is more
likely to be severe in declining periods because the welfare is increasingly impaired
as the socially desired level of capacity decreases. Therefore dissolving the situation
'excessive capacity' can be more bene¯cial in declining industries and can be a speci¯c
reason for justifying mergers in such industries. (However, not only are abundant
facilities just removed the number of ¯rms is also reduced by mergers. The presence of
the anticompetitive e®ect explains the very little e®ect of mergers on the total welfare
improvement in this experiment.)
8 Conclusion
In an oligopolistic industry the presence of business-stealing e®ect and ¯xed cost in-
duces socially excessive facilities. A facility hold by the business-stealing motive is only
partly a gain as a whole and if saving on ¯xed cost and sell-o® value are relatively large,
removing it will lead to the welfare improvement. Further, since the welfare loss by
the excessive facilities is expected to increase as the socially desirable level of capital
assets decreases, how to reduce such facilities is a pressing issue in declining industries.
But such divestment is not provided voluntarily since once a ¯rm removes its capital
his business will be stolen by his rivals. Thus, regardless of demand decline, socially
excessive facilities will not be dissolved.
In this research we focused on the role of merger as a device of promoting divestment
and examined whether the merger-induced divestment could improve the total welfare.
In analyzing mergers in an environment such that industry's capital level constantly
changed and demand level shifted down over time, we used the Markov perfect equilib-
rium framework of Ericson and Pakes (1995) to describe dynamic divestment decision
27Notice that in general a merger raises an equilibrium price and a pro¯t. So this has an opposite
e®ect on the incentive for divestment. The simulation result indicates that the internalization e®ect
overwhelms this pro¯t e®ect and consequently the facility removals are promoted by the mergers.
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process. My simulation exercise showed that merged ¯rm had more of incentive to
scrap its facilities and such divestments by mergers can lead to the improvement of the
welfare. Particularly savings on ¯xed cost plus sell-o® values were very large contri-
butions to the welfare improvement. This result will pose a critical policy question to
the current merger guideline in many countries.
Finally, I have to note some shortcomings of this research and future research
agenda. While I focused on behaviors after mergers, more realistic analysis can be
conducted by incorporating endogenous merger decision processes into the theoretical
model, such as Gowrisankaran (1999). Developing an empirical model of endogenous
mergers will be an exciting research topic and also be bene¯cial for both academic
researchers and competition policy makers. Further, this paper analyzed only an uni-
lateral e®ect of horizontal mergers. The reduction of the number of incumbents may
increase the possibility of collusive conducts within a market. In almost all cases, col-
lusion raises price and thus is harmful to consumers, and it lowers consumer surplus
further. Therefore, the welfare implication will be a®ected by such collusive conduct
and may be overturned. Modeling collusion in a dynamic world is also one of the open
research questions in IO and it is also an attractive research topic. The last point is
that I treated each regional market as an independent market and assumed away the
relation between divestment decisions across markets. If the correlation between mar-
kets exists, the divestment decision problem (and merger decision itself) will be a more
complicated one, not the simple description in this research. In static and very limited
market structure, this independent assumption can be relaxed (Jia (2009)). However
the interdependence across markets in a dynamic game will largely increase the state
variables of each ¯rm and cause a severe computational problem. Although it has some
di±culties, any extensions in this direction will expand the scope of empirical analyses
in the literature.
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Figure 1: Cement consumption and construction investment
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Table 1: Number of ¯rms before and after mergers in each regional market.
Number of ¯rms Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year 1993 9.12 1.66 7 12
Year 1998 5.95 1.21 4 8
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Figure 2: Reduction of cement distribution facilities (service station)
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Table 2: Three ¯rm concentration ratio. It is measured in terms of the number of
service station in each regional market.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Before Mergers
1993 0.5642 0.1185 0.4410 0.7931
After Mergers
1994 0.6312 0.1103 0.4950 0.7929
1998 0.8439 0.0918 0.7156 0.9539
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Table 3: Merging ¯rm share. It is measured in terms of the number of service stations
in each regional market.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1994 0.1912 0.0876 0.0303 0.3413
1998 0.2685 0.1169 0.0391 0.5184
Figure 3: The total number of service stations after mergers.
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Figure 4: Price movement before and after mergers.
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Table 4: Summary statistics. Price, Cement Consumption and Construction Inv. are
the market level data. Unit of price and construction investment are yen and ten
million yen respectively. Unit of cement consumption is ton. Supply Quantity, No.SS
(service station) and Divestment are the ¯rm level data. Unit of supply quantity is
ton. Divestment is the number of service stations scrapped.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Price 54 9151.052 753.0521 8085.889 11632.79
Cement consumption 54 5927664 2707078 2416937 1.40E+07
Construction Inv. 54 5431458 2565688 1604066 1.19E+07
Suppy Quantity 261 1001235.628 845183.2219 82051 3447859
No.SS 261 8.4573 5.6237 1 26
Divestment 261 0.2935 0.7138 0 4
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Table 5: Divestment frequency
Divestment Freq. Percent Cum.
-4 2 0.77 0.77
-3 7 2.68 3.45
-2 11 4.21 7.66
-1 35 13.41 21.07
0 206 78.93 100
Total 261 100
Table 6: Demand function parameter estimates. Price is the logarithm of the annual
average price of an individual market. Construction Inv. is the logarithm of the sum of
private and governmental construction investments. Hokkaido, Kinki, Shikoku, Tohoku
and Tokai are market ¯xed e®ects (relative to Chugoku).
Variables Coef. Std. Err.
Price -1.309 0.719
Construction Inv. 1.636 0.217
Hokkaido -0.392 0.058
Kinki 0.595 0.068
Shikoku -0.362 0.038
Tohoku 0.195 0.043
Tokai 0.430 0.089
Const. -1.776 3.844
No.obs = 54
Adj.R square = 0.9737
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Table 7: Cost function parameter estimates. No.SS is the number of ¯rm's SSs in a
region (in logarithm). Hokkaido, Kinki, Shikoku, Tohoku and Tokai are market ¯xed
e®ects (relative to Chugoku).
Variables Coef. Std.err.
Cost. 9.2433 0.0152
No.SS -0.1885 0.0148
Hokkaido -0.0481 0.0142
Kinki 0.0569 0.0141
Shikoku 0.0232 0.0141
Tohoku -0.1744 0.0149
Tokai -0.1334 0.0056
No.obs = 261
Adj.R square = 0.778
Table 8: Quantity prediction. Predicted quantity is computed with estimated demand
and cost function parameters.
Quantile predicted quantity observed quantity
10% 95083.9 168271
20% 408598.7 233807.9
30% 629789.7 460621.4
40% 755262.0 649979.8
50% 958510.2 805400
60% 1153626.2 1148229.4
70% 1377622.1 1483176
80% 1892844.1 1966102.6
90% 2372639.8 2392681.4
Mean 1071552.972 1034252.167
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Table 9: Policy function estimates. NO.SS is the number of own SSs. Competitor
j's SS is the number of competitor j' SSs, j = f1; 2; 3; 4g. The competitors are lined
up in descending order based on the number of their SSs. Construction Inv. is the
logarithm of the sum of private and governmental construction investments. Market
speci¯c e®ects are also included but not reported. The number of observations is 261.
Variables Coef. Std. Err.
No.SS 0.275 0.061
Competitor 1's No.SS 0.206 0.063
Competitor 2's No.SS 0.086 0.080
Competitor 3's No.SS 0.101 0.081
Competitor 4's No.SS 0.399 0.298
Construction Inv. -10.423 3.018
Const. 175.627 51.114
Log likelihood = -106.2387
Table 10: Policy function prediction. Compare the predicted frequencies of each action
with the observed frequencies. Predicted values are calculated by drawing 100 scrap
values from standard normal and extreme value distribution per each ¯rm. Correla-
tion coe±cient indicates the correlation the mean of 100 actions of each ¯rm and the
observed actions.
Divestment Normal Extreme Value Data
0 79.2 67.74 78.93
1 15.49 20.04 13.41
2 3.85 7.44 4.21
3 1.1 3.23 2.68
4 0.36 1.55 0.77
Correlation coef. 0.5294 0.5089
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Table 11: Structural parameter estimates. Estimates of mean and standard deviation
of the scrap value distribution including the sum of future ¯xed cost savings. Unit is
yen.
Mean Std. Err.
Mean of distribution ~¹ 1400275191 342745389.1
Std. Dev. of distribution ~k 55640912.47 143198533.5
Table 12: Welfare analysis. All values are the mean of 100 simulation paths of length
10 years. The starting state of the market without mergers is ! = (11; 10; 9; 8; 7; 4; 4; z)
and that of the market with mergers is set ! = (21; 15; 9; 8; z) respectively. The starting
demand level z is the amount of construction investment in year 1994 and common to
both two markets. Units of all ¯gures are billion yen.
w/ Mergers w/o Mergers Di®erence
Consumers surplus 875.3185 890.9166 -15.5981
Producers surplus 78.786 54.78553 24.00046
Fixed cost -8.4218 -9.219 0.7972
Scrap value 11.56814 2.140756 9.427386
Total welfare 957.2508 938.6239 18.62693
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